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T H E  STU D Y  O F R EL IG IO U S BELIEF 
A FTER  DO N A LD  D A V ID SO N
K e v in  S g h il b r a g k
Scholars in religious studies are increasingly drawing important insights from 
Davidson's philosophy of language. Unfortunately, the most prominent ofDavid- 
son's interpreters in religious studies have been Rortian neopragmatists who, /  
argue, have read into Davidson views which are not his own. This essay seeks to 
disentangle Davidson's stancefrom its neopragmatist interpretations. The goal is to 
understand his stance in order to see how one might approach the study ofreligious 
beliefs, and in particular religious metaphysical beliefs, from a Davidsonian per- 
spective.
I am someone who has ^w ays been intrigued by religious teachings 
about w hat exists that are com ^chcnsivc in scope. T he intellectual 
representatives of religious (im m unities often seem to be interested 
in speaking of the objects and events of hum an lives not only insofar 
as they are the particular things they are bu t also insofar as they 
exemplify traits that they share with everything else that exists. They 
often seem to be interested, in other words, with the c a r á c te r  of 
reality in general. Let me give one brief example. It is said that when 
Dogcn Kigcn, the Soto Zen Buddhist teacher, saw the inccnsc from 
his m other’s funeral, he was struck by the rising and dissipating 
smoke as emblematic of the tem porality or im perm anence of all 
things. And tomporality or im perm anence, Dogcn elaborated, is an 
aspect of reality from which no entity is exempt. Im perm anence is a 
characteristic of w hat is that is completely comprehensive; it is that 
w ithout which nothing exists; it is the nature of things. O f course, 
Dogcn was not interested in the nature of things solely as an intcllcc- 
tuai exercise bu t rather as an aspect of transform ing people to live in 
accord with it.1 In any event, analogous statements can be found in 
other religious traditions in which “im perm anence” is replaced by 
the influence of karm a or God or Brahm an or the Dao. In this paper 
I will skate over the fact that the term  “metaphysics” means so m any
1 I examine D ogen’s metaphysics in greater detail in Schilbrack (2000a).
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different things to different people and will refer to religious claims 
about the nature of things as religious metaphysics.
Several interpreters of religion go so far as to define religion as that 
form of culture in which the metaphysical question about the com- 
^chcnsivc  character of reality is explicitly asked and answered. I 
hope that, even if readers do not agree that the interest in mctaphys- 
ics is so central to religion that it should be part of the very definition 
of r^igion, they will agree that this interest is widespread. I also hope 
that readers will agree that, although one finds religious metaphysics 
most clearly in religious doctrines and the writings of religious intcl- 
lcctuals, one doesn’t only find it there. Some religious stories and 
rituals are designed to inculcate in people an r a r e n e s s  of the truth 
of these ^ m ^ c h c n s iv c  teachings و.
T he burden of this paper is that Donald D avidson’s ^ ilo so p h y  of 
language can shed a great deal of light on this widespread aspect of 
religion This journal has produced im و. portant work showing the 
mlcvancc of D avidson’s philosophy of language to the study of rcli- 
gion (Godlove 1992; ?enner 1995), and this essay seeks to build upon 
those m ore co m ^c len s iv c  papers. In the first part of this article I 
sketch D avidson’s views on the relationship between words and the 
world. In the second part I spell out where my ii^ cp m ta tio n  of 
Davidson differs from that of neopragmatists, which, I argue, can be 
distortcdly one-sided. In the third and last section I outline the sig- 
nificance of D avidson’s vfews for the study of religious beliefe.
1. Davidson and realism
In his essay “O n the very idea of conceptual scheme”, Davidson 
famously argues for the incoherence of w hat he calls h c m c /c o n tc n t  
dualism, h c m c /c o n tc n t  dualism is found in those ^ ilo so p h ic s  that 
seek to divide thought into two parts: a conceptual system that our 
m ind or our language provides, and the ^ c o n c e p tu a l  content that 
the world provides. Davidson notes two basic ways in which f i lo s o -  
phcrs have related the scheme to the content: they say either that
2 I seek to show fee relevance of metaphysies for the study of myths in Sehilbraek 
(2000b).
3 This despite the laek of importanee of religion to Davidson personally or philo- 
sophieally (see Davidson 1 :ووو 18-1 م)و  For an appreeiative but eritieal examination 
of Davidson’s influenee on soeial seientifie methods, see Henderson (1 وو3)م
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one’s conceptual scheme organizes content, or that the scheme fits it. 
To say that language “organizes” c ^ c ricn c c  is to say that it divides 
up, systematizes, or gives form to the otherwise u ^ n tc i^ rc tcd , form- 
less content of our thoughts. M y own m etaphor for the organizing 
task is to say that one’s conceptual scheme is like a pair of eyeglasses, 
because it is “through” one’s conceptual scheme that the world is 
given. T o say that language “fits” c^ c ricn c c  is to say that on this 
account it predicts, faces, or accounts for what is. M y m etaphor for 
the fitting of c ^ c ricn c c  is on this account that language is like a map.
Davidson argues that neither way of accounting for the relation 
between the scheme and the content works. A conceptual scheme 
cannot organize the world (or “reality” or “natu re”) because to or- 
ganizc something implies that the something is plural. We can only 
organize distinct objects. As Davidson says, “ [sjomconc who sets out 
to organize a closet organizes the things in it” (1984: 192). But distinct 
objects are already structured entities. They are not formless we- 
know-not-whats, waiting to be schematized by our minds or our 
language. W hether we speak of objects such as knives and forks, 
cabbages and kingdoms, or we speak of events such as losing a button 
or stubbing a toe, as soon as the world falls under a d c ^ r i p t i o n o r  
as Davidson likes to say, as soon as part of the world is “indivi- 
duatcd”— it can no longer play the role of u i^ n c c p tu a liz c d  content. 
Since it is impossible to identify what is getting organized except in 
the terms of the conceptual scheme, the idea that a conceptual 
scheme “organizes” founders on the problem  of identifying some- 
thing without interpreting it. It founders, in other words, because it 
appeals to an idea of a “raw ” or noum cnal world that is otherwise 
uninterpreted or ^ c o n c e p tu a l  or theory-neutral.
Instead of saying that one’s conceptual scheme organizes the 
world or that it organizes the objects and events in the world, one 
might seek to understand the relation between word and world by 
saying that sentences fit or m ap onto those objects and events. But 
Davidson argues that the fitting m etaphor is equally faulty. T o make 
sense of the idea of fitting, one requires something for whole sen- 
tcnccs, not just singular terms, to fit. T he sentence “T he teacher 
m ade it to class on tim e”, if true, must fit not just the teacher or the 
class bu t a complex section of space and time, w hat R orty has called 
a “chunk of reality somehow isomorphic to that sentence” (1991: 
137). It needs to fit the/act that the teacher m ade it to class on time. 
The problem  here is how one can locate or individuate that fact.
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apart from our conceptual scheme. As Davidson says: “O ne can 
locate individual objects, if the sentences happens to nam e or de- 
scribe them, but even such location makes sense relative only to a 
frame of reference, and so presum ably the frame of reference must be 
included in whatever it is [that a sentence fits]” (1990: 303). Once 
again, the schem e/content m odel founders on the impossible need to 
speak of the world apart from the concepts that would give sense to 
that reference.
If Davidson is right about the impossibility of schem e/content 
dualism (and in my judgem ent he is), then there is a nest of ^ s it io n s  
in m odern ^ ilo so p h y  that are subverted by his view.4 For example, 
if language cannot be said to fit the facts, because there are no facts 
in this sense, then we cannot explain w hat makes a sentence true by 
saying that it corecsponds to the facts. C n scq u cn tly , Davidson says, 
there can be no correspondence theory of truth. A second is that our 
prepositional attitudes are taken by some to have content by virtue of 
being r e c e n t r i o n s  of the world. But if language cannot be said to 
fit the facts, because there are no facts in this sense to fit, then 
representationalism fails as a theory of content. W ithout interm ediate 
entities for our sentences to fit, Davidson finds no sense in a represen- 
tationalist theory of content or in a correspondence theory of truth.
Davidson gives a striking argum ent, drawn from Frege, that illus- 
trates the problem  with explaining tru th  as correspondence to the 
facts (1984: chap. 2-3; see also Evninc 1991: 180-182). Davidson 
argues that if one wants to say that “p ” corresponds to the fact that 
p, then one must also be willing to say that “p ” corresponds to facts 
other than p, such as ٩ , as long as the sentences that replace “p ” and 
“q ” are logically equivalent and cannot differ in tru th  value, or differ 
only in that a singular term  in p is replaced by a coextensive singular 
term  in q. Davidson concludes that a sentence that corresponds to 
one fact m ust correspond to them  all, or rather, that the allegedly 
d i^nguishab lc facts cannot really be distinguished. ،،[W]e m ay read 
the result of our argum ent as showing that there is exactly one fact. 
Dcreriptions like ،the fact that there are stupas in N epal’, if they 
describe at all, describe the same thing: T he G reat Fact. No point 
remains in d itn g u ish in g  am ong various names of T he G reat fact 
when written after ،corresponds to ’; we may as well settle for the 
single phrase ،corresponds to the G reat Faet’” (1984: 42). Ifoci^cnccs
4 The next three paragraphs refleet Davidson (1رموو .
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nam e anything, then they nam e the same thing. Consequently, to say 
that a sentence fits the facts is no c ^ la n a tio n  of truth, because which 
facts it fits cannot be untangled from T he G reat Fact.
Several o m m cn ta to rs  have noted that despite his io n o clasm  
Davidson repudiates only correspondence-to-facts theories and that 
he retains a version of correspondence in his ^ p ro a c h  to truth. And 
it is true that even in “T he structure and content of tru th ” Davidson 
suggests that there is “no harm  in the idea of correspondence as 
along as it is properly understood” (1990: 280).5 But under any nam e, 
the point does not change that without distinet entities for sentences 
to correspond to, it is not an explanation to say that a sentence is true 
because it agrees with the facts. It is simpler to say just that the 
sentence is true.
W hat are the im ^ications of this view for realism? Wc have seen 
in these arguments that, for Davidson, the tru th  of our beliefs is not 
completely independent of language. For this reason, Davidson con- 
eludes that it is misleading to call his philosophy “realist” . Realism, 
he has come to foci, suggests a radically 1̂ - c p is tc m ic  view of truth, 
and he does not hold a radically 1̂ - c p is tc m ic  view of truth. Even 
though D avidson’s account of tru th  is non-epistemic— in the sense 
that holding a justified belief or a coherent set of beliefs is not enough 
to make them  true, and there is no belief which m ay not be false—  
Davidson now rejects the realist label.
T o summarize, I interpret Davidson as giving us good reasons why 
one cannot get outside one’s beliefs and language in order to test 
whether those beliefs or that language corresponds to the way things 
are. In other words, I read “O n the very idea” as an attack on the 
idea of noum cna or the world as it is “in itself’. I agree with David- 
son that the very idea of a noum cnal world that in principle cannot 
be described should fall out of philosophy altogether.
2. Davidson and neopragmatism
I think that until this point my account of Davidson has been in 
accord with the way that !^ p ra g m a tis t  ^ ilo so p h c rs  have inter­
5 If “The structure and euntent of truth” is elaborating but not eliminating the 
eorrespondenee theory, then it eontinues Davidson’s projeet in “True to the faets”, 
where he argues that “the debilities of partieular formulations of the eorrespondenee 
theory ought not be held against the theory [as sueh]” (1984: 54).
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preted Davidson. T o be honest, a great deal of what I understand 
about D avidson’s philosophy and its significance is due to the writ- 
ings of Rfehard Rorty, and to those neopragm atists in religious stud- 
ics like Jeffrey Stout, Wesley Robbins, and N ancy F m ^ cn b crry . 
Nevertheless, the m ore o ^ a v id s o n  I read, the m ore I have come to 
believe that I ^ ^ a g m a t i s ts  have pu t forward some interpretations of 
Davidson’s work that are not D a id so n ian . I w ant to point out three.
T he first and most serious m in d c rs ta n d in g  is the idea that 
Davidson’s ^ p ro a c h  is “c o le c n tis t” or anti-ontological. I believe 
that such an idea can be seen, for example, in Nancy F m ^ c n b c rry ’s 
statem ent that D avidson’s account of tru th  “alfows us to talk about 
^ : c n c c s  instead of about objects” (1 ثووو ة1 ره . Such statements sug- 
gcst a very dualistic and language-imprisoned interpretation of 
Davidson’s view of truth. It seems to reflect the view that if wc eauT 
make sense of representationalism, then we shouldn’t say that our 
sentences refer to the world at all, but only to language.
If this is the !^ p ra g m a tis t  view, such statements fail to avoid w hat 
R orty calls “an overenthusiastic pragm atism  which throws ... the 
W orld overboard” (1991: 132), and they go beyond D avidson’s view 
and its im ^ ic^ io n s . According to Davidson, we learn the m eaning of 
terms by being c d i t i o n c d  to respond verbally to specific objects 
and events in the world. Similarly, we interpret others by o n n cc tin g  
them  to their c!wironmcnt. Because for Davidson we are always 
already related to the world in this causal way, our beliefs are in 
general veridical. Given this account of m eaning, Davidson’s account 
of tru th  is that tru th  is the relations of sentences to sequences of 
objects and events in the world as spelled out with Tarskian satisfac- 
tion co d ifio n s . T he notion of satisfaction is not a relation of sen- 
tcnccs to special entities like facts or states of affairs, bu t it is a 
relation between words and the world. Hence Davidson says that 
“the tru th  of an utterance depends on ... how the world is mTanged. 
... Two fotorpretore, as unlike in culture, language, and point of view 
as you please, can disagree over w hether an utterance is true, bu t 
only if they differ about how things are in the w orld” (1999: 309). 
W hether or not one speaks of this as a “correspondence theory of a 
sort”,6 one cannot drop the relations to the world out, for ^ c o rd in g  
to Davidson “there is no way to give such a theory [i.e., a Tarskian 
theory] w ithout employing a concept like reference or a is fa c tio n
6 The phrase is Davidson’s (1 وو0:302)م
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which relates expressions to objects in the world” (1990: 302).7 This is 
also the significance of D avidson’s arguments with Q uine that the 
^ o ^ s i t io n a l  content and m eaning of observation sentences depend 
not on the proxim al but on the distal stimulus, which is to say, not on 
sense data but on the objects and events in the world.
Those who hope or fear that D avidson’s repudiation of schem e/ 
content dualism involves the rejection of all possible senses of repre- 
s t a t i o n ,  correspondence, and realism should note a recent paper by 
Stephen Neale. Neale points out that, although in “O n the very idea” 
Davidson rejects the ideas (1) that language organizes the world in 
general, (2) that it organizes distinct parts of the world, and (3) that it 
fits distinct parts of the world, he never rejects the fourth possible 
idea, that sentences fit, represent, or correspond to the world in gen- 
eral. Neale holds that, for Davidson, the world exists independently 
of our thought and language and that it is the world in general that 
makes sentences true.
Neale’s point is commomensical:
“Suppose that a simple sentenee ،Smith is sitting’ is true. Then surely, 
given the meaning of the sentenee, it is true beeause of ،how the world 
is arranged’: one of the entities in the world, Smith, is sitting. Indeed, 
this mueh is given by a Davidsonian truth theory (and no appeal to an 
alternative set of axioms will alter this fact). So the world makes the 
sentenee true in at least this sense: if the world had been arranged 
differently-i.e., if the things in the wold had been arranged differently 
(for the world to be arranged, the things in it must be arranged)—if 
Smith were, say, standing, the sentenee ،Smith is sitting’ would not be 
true. Denying this would drain all eontent from the eoneept of truth 
that permeates Davidson’s writings” (Neale 1999: 663).
There is no reference here to raw sensations, facts, or things in them- 
selves. Just the object. Smith.
It is telling that in his response Davidson not only concurs with 
Neale, saying “I gave no argum ent against saying the world makes 
some sentences true”, and retracts his claim that the world does not 
make our sentences true as a mistake. De also explicitly links his 
willingness to speak of the world to a w arning about !^ p ra g m a tis t  
interpretations of his work. “We cannot explain how language works
7 Davidson has made this same point for some time: “theories of truth of the kind 
considered here do require that a relation between entities and expressions be ehar- 
aeterized (،satisfaetion’). It is not easy to see how a satisfactory route to truth ean 
eseape this step if the language the theory treats has the usual quantifieational re- 
sources” (1984: xv).
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without invoking an ontology ... R orty has m isunderstood me if he 
believes I ever thought Otherwise” (1999b: 668, 669).
In the light of Neale’s clarification ofD avidson, it pays to return to 
Davidson’s use of Frege’s argument. Recall that Davidson uses Frcgc 
to argue that if a sentence corresponds to a fact, then it coiTcsponds 
to all of them , the G reat Fact. This argum ent appears to be a reductio 
of correspondence arguments, because if the tru th  of a sentence can- 
not be explained by its to its own a r t ic u la r  faet, then the
sense of “corresponds” seems to drop out. But the Frege argum ent 
can also be read as support for Neale’s view on representing. T o say 
that a sentence refers to T he Great Fact is another way of saying that 
true sentences are m ade true. They are m ade true not by a r t ic u la r  
facts— thcsc still cannot be id iv id u a tc d - b u t  by the world in gen- 
eral, by that which is, by the G reat Fact. It remains true that this 
docs not introduce entities to correspond to individual sentences, and 
so it docs not give us a definition of truth, bu t it docs clarify that for 
Davidson ontology docs not fall out. O n his account, our true sen- 
tcnccs are about the world.8
Although our knowledge of the world is dependent on language in 
general in the sense that we have no access to the world apart from 
our language (and therefore nothing can justify a belief bu t another 
belief), this view is not radically cpistcmic (or “anti-realist”) since the 
world is independent of individual sentences in the sense that any 
sentence can be false. A. c. Genova has helpfully labeled D avidson’s 
view a “modestly non-epistem ic” concept of tru th  (1999: 172). O n 
this interpretation, Davidson is therefore not “beyond realism and 
n ti-rca lism ” in the sense that he dissolves or ignores the question of 
how we can speak of the objective, c^a -lin g u is tic  world. He consid- 
crs this a real question^ Davidson is beyond realism and antircalism 
only in the sense that he has considered the question legitimate and 
even im portant, bu t has found an answer that is so balanced that it 
fits neither of the other two extreme positions.
8 I want to thank Terry Godlove for bringing to my attention this possible use of 
the Frege argument.
 Davidson has written of Rorty: “Where we differ, if we do, is on whether there و
remains a question how, given that we eannot ؛get outside our beliefs and our 
language so as to find some test other than eoherenee,’ we nevertheless ean have 
knowledge o f and talk about, an objeetive publie world whieh is not of our own 
making. I think this question does remain, while I suspeet that Rorty doesn’t think 
so” (1 و86: 3مل ). Rorty agrees that he does not think this a good question (1136 :موو - 
137).
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This interpretation of Davidson as modestly non-epistemic ac- 
counts for his repeated use of the allegedly forbidden phrase “makes 
true”, for example, in his statem ent that “it is no accident that 
،Schnee ist wciss’ is true if and only if snow is white; it is the white- 
ness of snow that makes ،Schnee ist weiss’ true” (1984: xiv; emphasis 
in the original). One sees this phrase again in the often-quoted state- 
m ent that “all the evidence there is is just what it takes to make our 
sentences or theories true. ... That c ^ c ricn c c  takes a certain course, 
that our skin is w arm ed or punctured, that the universe is finite, these 
facts, if we like to talk this way, make our sentences and theories 
true” (1984: 194; emphasis in the original). Davidson goes on to say, 
as one would expect, that “this point is pu t better w ithout m ention of 
facts”, bu t the point cannot be m ade at all w ithout m ention of the 
world as that whfoh makes true sentences true.
Thus D avidson’s ^ p ro a c h  not only o u n tcn an ccs, it requires an 
c^a -lin g u is tic  reality. W hy do !^ p ra g m a tis ts  not follow Davidson 
here? I ’m not sure. O n the one hand, there is nothing that is essential 
to ^ag m a tism  that requires anti-realism, even when pragm atism  is 
com bined with an anti-foundationalism  or an n i - m c t^ h y s ic a l  
stance or whatever it is exactly that makes it “neo” . This is crystal- 
clear in the !^ p ra g m a tic  hum anism  of Wesley Robbins (see, inter 
alia, Robbins 1998, 1999) which shows no sign of anti-realism or 
“cosmic estrangem ent” . According to Robbins, our beliefs and dc- 
sires can no m ore vary id cp cn d c n tly  of the rest of the world than 
our bodies can, and this kind of world-submerged position is wholly 
Davidsonian.
Nevertheless, when Davidson closes “O n the very idea” with the 
sentence that “ [i]n giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do 
not give up the worldو bu t re-establish unm cdiatcd touch with [it]” 
(1984: 198; emphasis added), R orty calls this “the world well lost” 
(Rorty 1982). And when Davidson wants to “insist that knowledge is 
of an objective world independent of our thought and knowledge” 
and distinguishes his position from R orty’s by ! i te ra tin g  that “we 
can have knowledge, and talk about, an objective public world that is 
not of our making” (1986: 307, 310), R orty calls this “no m ore than 
out-dated rhetorie” (Rorty 1991: 149).10
10 Two critical treatments of Rorty’s appropriation of Davidson (though they pre- 
date “The structure and the content of truth”) are M aria Baghramian (1990) and 
D orothea Frede (1987).
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My own view is that the neopragmatists need not fear D avidson’s 
references to the world. Davidson will never appeal to privileged 
c^c ricn ccs  that cannot he conceptualized or that provide indubita- 
hlc knowledge. Nevertheless, Davidson does hold the modestly non- 
cpistcmic position that even though one must speak of the world 
under a dc^rip tion , it is still the world that one speaks of. Nco- 
pragmatists can avoid this language-imprisoned and anti-reahst ١٧^^ 
of making their points— and if they w ant to be D a id so n ian , they 
have to.
T here are two m ore points at which I think the !^ p rag m a tis ts  
m isrepresent Davidson. N o ^ a ^ a t i s t s  regularly suggest that David- 
son is their ally in their e jec tio n  of m ct^hysics, that Davidson is in 
the non-metaphysical pragm atist camp. (Here Wesley Robbins is 
guilty.) But since Davidson docs not consider talk about w hat the 
world is like illegitimate, there is no reason to think that he considers 
talk about w hat the world is like in general illegitimate. M oeovcr, 
Davidson is explicitly a ^ o p o n c n t  of m ct^hysics. As he says in “T he 
m ethod of tru th  in m ct^ h y sic s”, an article widely cited in general 
bu t rarely cited by !o ^ a g m a tis ts ,  “by studying the most general 
aspects of language we will be studying the most general aspects of 
reality” (1984: 201). O f course, to express an interest in metaphysics 
docs not keep Davidson from being a ^ag m atis t; on the co ^ ra ry , 
Davidson’s language in this quote recalls Jo h n  Dewey’s interest in 
studying the generic features of reality. But it docs keep him from 
being a !^ p ra g m a tis t. They may consider Davidson’s cd o rsc m c n t 
of metaphysics “bad Davidson”, or they may think that ( p o s in g  
metaphysics is w hat Davidson “should have said”, bu t honesty re- 
quires that Davidson not be pu t forward as a non-metaphysical phi- 
losophcr.
My last point is that ! o ^ a g m a t is ts  sometimes assert that David- 
son’s rejection of h e m e / c o g e n t  dualism i!walidatcs tm !cc n d cn ta l 
arguments. R orty says, with some paradox, that Davidson gives us a 
t!n sccn d cn ta l argum ent to end all tm !cc !fo cn ta l argum ents ال.  
F !^ k cn b c rry  says p erhaps trying to avoid the paradox) that to agree 
that the very idea of conceptual schemes is unintelligible “amount[s] 
to giving up all transcendental argum ents” (1999: 328). Again, 1 think 
that this m ie p rc sc n ts  D avidson’s work.
11 Rorty argues against the intelligibility of transeendental arguments (without 
referenee to Davidson) in Rorty ( 1 7 1 و ).
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In the interests of full disclosure, I adm it that this is the weakest of 
my three points because Davidson has not explicitly said that he 
endorses transcendental arguments. H e has said that his work “can be 
justified by a transcendental argum ent” (1984: 72; emphasis added), 
which certainly sounds as if he thinks transcendental arguments are 
possible, and he refers his readers to “O n the very idea of a conccp- 
tual scheme” and to “T he m ethod of tru th  in metaphysics”. M orco- 
ver, it seems to me that the most natural way to understand David- 
son’s project is as an analysis of the tm m cci^cn ta l conditions for the 
possibility of interpretation. This is how William M aker reads David- 
son, as does Carol Rovanc, M ichael Root, j .  E. M alpas, A. c. 
Genova, D orothea Ercdc, and others who spell out in detail what 
they call the tm m ccndcntal features of Davidson’s arguments. R ather 
than simply asserting that Davidson opposes tm m cci^cn ta l argu- 
ments, it would be good to see the neopragmatists enter this debate.
3. Davidson and religious belief
W hat light can Davidson shed on the study of religious bclicl? The 
pioneer on this question is Terry Godlovc (1984, 1989, 1994). O ne of 
Godlovc’s central arguments is that Davidson makes it possible for us 
to account for the diversity of religious belief w ithout iiwoking the 
framework model that leads to relatM sm. Godlove shows those in 
religious studies how, with Davidson, one can say that any diversity 
of religious belief presupposes a background of shared belief Diver- 
gcncc of belief in general must be relatively limited and this carries 
over into religion. Divergence over religious m atters will also be rcla- 
tivcly limited, and it will concern abstract or (as Godlove calls them) 
“theoretical” issues. Thus religious beliefs may have w hat Godlove 
helpfully labels an “interpretive priority” for a believer, in the sense 
that their religious beliefs can come to bear on their interpretation of 
all (or most) of the objects and events in their lives. But one should 
not say that religious beliefs have an cpistcmic priority, in the sense 
that they provide a framework or conceptual scheme through which 
a believer’s world is organized for all the reasons that Davidson gives. 
In my judgem ent, this d i^ n c tio n  between interpretive priority and 
cpistcmic priority is an invaluable tool for religious studies.
T he question I want to pursue builds upon this repudiation of the 
framework model. My question is: after Davidson, w hat can we say
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that religious bclicfr are ساك ? In answering this question I w ant to 
bring to the study of religious beliefs the conclusions I reached above 
coirecrning belief in general. This is to say that religious beliefs 
cannot fo la te  the p ic tu re s  given in “O n the very idea”, bu t they 
can have the following c a rá c te r :  first, they can refer to the world, to 
c^re-linguistic reality: ،^csus rose from the dead” is true if and only 
if Jesus rose from the dead. Second, they can be m ct^h y sica l in the 
sense that they can seek to describe what Davidson calls the large 
features of reality. T hird  (though this is a point I will not develop in 
this article), they can be m pportcd by tm m ccndcntal arguments. O n 
a D v id so n ian  view, therefore, religious beliefs can be understood as 
seeking to describe the general c a rá c te r  of reality, where “reality” 
m eans an objective world independent of our thought and knowl- 
edge. In short, Davidson enables the study of religious metaphysics.
W hat docs the study of religious metaphysics look like, after 
Davidson? For some, the term  “m ct^h y sics” refers to a view of the 
world precisely in the sense of a conceptual scheme, and a religious 
metaphysics would be a religious conceptual scheme. O n this inter- 
f e ta t io n ,  the study of language or culture reveals a system of con- 
ccpts or c^cgorics with which a people structure their ufovcrsc. 
Benjamin Tee W horf, for example, writes that “ [t]hc H opi language 
and culture conceals a metaphysics, such as our so-called naive view 
of space and times docs, or as the relativity theory docs; yet it is a 
different metaphysics from either. In order to describe the structure 
of the universe ^ c o rd in g  to the H opi, it is ireccssary to attem pt—  
insofar as it is possible— to make explicit this metaphysics, properly 
dcscribablc only in the H opi language” (1956: 58). Davidson’s criti- 
cism of relrem c/coi^cnt dualism is designed to undercut precisely 
this kind of conceptual schemes— in fact, Davidson (1984: 199) 
points to W horf as an o ffc !fo c r-an d  so Davidson clearly rejects 
religious metaphysics in this sense. T here cannot be metaphysics in 
this sense because the idea that the m ct^h y sica l scheme organizes or 
fits c^ c ricn c c  cannot be cashed out. Similarly, there cannot be in- 
o m m cn su rab lc  or ^ tcm ativc  metaphysical schemes because nothing 
could count as evidence that the m ct^h y sica l beliefs cannot be inter- 
pretcd in our language that was not at the same time evidence that 
that activity was not speech bclavior.
For other people, the term  “m ct^h y sics” refers not to a conccp- 
tual scheme but to a special kind of content. O n  this view, mctaphysi- 
cal beliefs are beliefs about the noum cnal or m ^ rn a tu ra l  world.
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They “transcend” the ordinary world of hum an c^c ricn cc . (I as- 
sume that this was the view held by the bookstore clerk who tried to 
help me find ?ctcr V an Inwagcn’s book Metaphysics by scanning the 
section m arked “O ccult”.)
In both of these senses of the term  “m ct^h y sics” is entangled in 
the h c m c /c o n tc n t  dualism that c l^ a c tc rizc s  so m uch theory in 
religion. It is no surprise that I^avidson objects to understandings of 
metaphysics that turn on this dualism. But it is another question 
whether Davidson objects to metaphysics that does not.
So to repeat my question, what does the study of religious meta- 
physics look like, after Davidson?
I want to ^ p ro a c h  my answer to this question by beginning with 
a homey, in -re lig io u s , and non-metaphysical example. Imagine a 
swimming hole hidden away in the O zark M ountains on a sweltering 
sum m er day. A person steps into the water and is surprised by the 
faet that, where she stepped in, the water is actually boi^clh lling ly  
cold. Suppose this person pecula tes to herself, “I bet this water is this 
cold not only here at my ankles, bu t throughout this d im m in g  hole” . 
She is thinking something like: every part of this pool is bonc-chill- 
ingly cold. If she thinks in ^ i l o ^ h c r - c s c ,  she may think “this pool 
as such is cold” or “every part of this pool is c^ m c tc rizcd  by being 
cold”.
Here is a claim about the com ^chcnsivc c a rá c te r  of something. 
It is not an attem pt to discover the pool’s own preferred sclf-dcscrip- 
tion. It does not imply the existence of tertia, ^ ilo so p h ica l interme- 
diaries, nor any faets isomorphic to this sentence. T he sentence that 
“this pool as such is cold” is true if and only if this pool as such is 
cold. “Every part of this pool is characterized by being cold” is true 
if and only if every part of this pool is c l^ a c tc r iz c d  by being cold. 
But if these sound like legitimate statements, fully permissible on 
Davidson’s account, then statements like the following would be 
equally legitimate: “Reality as such is cold” or “Every part of reality 
is c l^ a c tc r iz c d  by being cold”. These are putative metaphysical 
statements, making claims about the general c a r á c te r  of reality, 
though they are not very good ones and can be straightforwardly 
falsified. T he point is only that such m ct^h y sica l claims are not 
ruled out by D avidson’s u d c rs ta n d in g  of language. But here is a 
putative statement of religious metaphysics that I believe to be 
equally acceptable on D avidson’s terms: “Every part of reality is 
characterized by being im perm anent” . This statem ent is m uch more
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difficult to disprove, but my goal is not to argue for or against any 
particular statem ent of religious metaphysics but only to show their 
legitimacy from a Davidsonian point of view.
From  a Davidsonian ^rsp ectiv e , then, religious metaphysics can 
be seen as beliefs (or systems of beliefs) about the world. O ne need 
not see religious metaphysics as “mystical” , mysterious, nor necessar- 
ily wedded to s u m p t io n s  about schemeless content. M etaphysical 
beliefs are distinctive insofar as they are unrestricted and seek to 
describe the character of reality as such. As Godlove puts it, “the 
e i^ m p a ss in g  c a r á c te r  of mligious belief’ reflects the fact that reli- 
gious teachings seek to describe how things are in such an abstract or 
theoretical way that they provide conceptions of a general order of 
existence (1989: 106). Metaphysical claims m ay not be easy to inter- 
pret. Frecisely because they are held true in any and all observable 
circumstances, religious beliefs m ade at this level of abstraetion can 
raise difficulties for an interpreter (see Godlove 1994). But foe idea 
that religious beliefs about foe general foaracter of reality raise m ore 
ii^erpretive challenges than religious beliefs about empirical m atters 
is not news. M ore work needs to be done on how a field linguist 
m ight make sense of such claims, but this does not change foe gen- 
eral point: religious metaphysics are intelligible on D^widsonian crite- 
ria.
Dem  is one last observation in closing. Davidson calls schem e/ 
content dualism a dogm a fo  empiricism and it is not clear why repu- 
diating a dogm a of an n i -m e t^ h y s ic a l  tradition is it^ fo u p p o sed  to 
be an n t i-m e t^ h y s ic a l move. O n foe co ^ ra ry , m l ^ e / c o n te n t  
dualism has been employed precisely to block metaphysical inquiry 
into foe nature of things, on foe grounds that foe things in themselves 
are on foe far side of our conceptual scheme and so forever inacces- 
sible to our knowledge. By rejecting m l ^ e / c o n t e n t  dualism, 
Davidson does not invalidate metaphysics. O n  foe co ^ ra ry , 
Davidson makes metaphysical inquiry legitimate again— or more 
precisely, he shows how foe m odern (and postmodern) antipathy to 
metaphysics and to religious metaphysics in particular depends on a 
dualism that is no longer tenable.
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